Evaluating Conversational Success: Weighted Message Exchange Games by Asher, Nicholas & Paul, Soumya
HAL Id: hal-02354391
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02354391
Submitted on 7 Nov 2019
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
Evaluating Conversational Success: Weighted Message
Exchange Games
Nicholas Asher, Soumya Paul
To cite this version:
Nicholas Asher, Soumya Paul. Evaluating Conversational Success: Weighted Message Exchange
Games. 20th Workshop on the Semantics and Pragmatics of Dialogue (SemDial 2016), Jul 2016,
Rutgers, New Jersey, United States. pp.55-64. ￿hal-02354391￿
Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent 
to the repository administrator: tech-oatao@listes-diff.inp-toulouse.fr 
This is an author’s version published in: 
http://oatao.univ-toulouse.fr/22182 
Official URL 
http://semdial.org/anthology/papers/Z/Z16/Z16-3010/ 
Open  Archive  Toulouse  Archive  Ouverte 
OATAO is an open access repository that collects the work of Toulouse 
researchers and makes it freely available over the web where possible 
To cite this version: Asher, Nicholas and Paul, Soumya Evaluating 
Conversational Success: Weighted Message Exchange Games. (2016) In: 
20th Workshop on the Semantics and Pragmatics of Dialogue (SemDial 
2016), 16 July 2016 - 18 July 2016 (Rutgers, New Jersey, United States). 
Evaluating conversational success: Weighted Message Exchange Games
Nicholas Asher and Soumya Paul ∗
IRIT, Universite´ Paul Sabatier
118 Route de Narbonne
31062 Toulouse, France
nicholas.asher@irit.fr, soumya.paul@gmail.com
Abstract
We analyze evaluations of conversational
success and how such evaluations relate
to notions of discourse content and struc-
ture. To do so, we extend the framework of
Message Exchange (ME) games by adding
weights or scores to the players’ moves
and then accumulating these weights us-
ing discounting to evaluate a conversation-
alist’s performance. We illustrate our anal-
ysis on a fragment of a recent political de-
bate.
1 Introduction
As is by now well accepted, a discourse is more
than an unstructured set of utterances; these utter-
ances should, for example, be related to one an-
other in a coherent fashion. But in general, not
just any coherent arrangement of utterances will
do. If one’s goal is merely to avoid an awkward si-
lence, then maintaining conversational coherence
might suffice to achieve one’s ends, but conver-
sational goals are frequently more ambitious than
this. Sometimes interlocutors converse to get to
the truth of a matter; other times, a speaker says
what she does to convince her interlocutor or a
third party, an observer, to do something or to
adopt a certain belief; in the latter case, the truth
of what she says might be less important than its
persuasiveness. One might win a political debate,
for instance, even if the majority of the claims one
asserts in that debate are false, as the 2016 series
of debates between Republican candidates for the
U.S. Presidency illustrates.
With (Grice, 1975), we hold that conversations
are rational activities, and that agents act so as to
maximize their conversational success. But in or-
der for that to be possible, conversational agents,
and observers, must be able to evaluate conversa-
tions for such success, and this requires moving
∗The authors thank ERC grant 269427 for research support.
beyond evaluations of discourse content in terms
of truth or satisfaction. In particular, we want
to know how the linguistic and discourse struc-
ture and content of a speaker’s contributions affect
that evaluation. In this paper, we propose a model
of context-sensitive evaluations of conversational
success and investigate how such evaluations re-
late to notions of discourse content and structure.
In our view, a better understanding of conversa-
tional success will shed light on how agents struc-
ture their contributions and how these contribu-
tions affect the overall shape and content of the
conversation.
Conversational success need not be shared by
all members of a conversation; speakers can have
different and even opposed conversational goals.
We thus develop our model of conversational suc-
cess using the framework of Message Exchange
(ME) Games (Asher et al., 2016), in which a con-
versation is understood as a sequential, extended
game that does not require interlocutors to share
interests or goals. To avoid troublesome back-
wards induction results that predict that no con-
versation takes place in cases of opposed interests
(Crawford and Sobel, 1982; Asher et al., 2016),
an ME game conceives of a conversation without
a commonly known, set end and thus models con-
versations as infinitary games. Such games are
evaluated by a Jury. Intuitively, a Jury is any en-
tity or a group of entities that evaluates a conver-
sation and decides the winner. For example, in
a courtroom situation, the Jury is the courtroom
Jury itself whereas in a political debate, the Jury is
the audience of the debate which maybe the en-
tire citizenry of a country. A Jury can even be
one of the participants of the conversation itself.
Thus, a Jury for a particular conversation setup
depends entirely on the context. But given such
a setup, it is always clear who or what constitutes
the Jury. We formalize the Jury here as a weight
function or scoring function over the sequence of
conversational moves. To accumulate the individ-
ual weights to obtain a global score of a conver-
sation for the players, we will use techniques of
discounting (Shapley, 1953).
To motivate these decisions in our analysis of-
conversational success, consider a recent example
from the U.S. Republican primary debates (Febru-
ary 6, 2016) where things go dramatically wrong
for a candidate Marco Rubio (R), the junior US
senator from Florida. The crucial episode can be
viewed at (Christie-Rubio-debate, 2016), and the
transcript at (Christie-Rubio-transcript, 2016).
We describe the relevant part of that conver-
sation below where the numbers correspond to
blocks of sequential discourse moves making up
a coherent unit. In terms of the linguistic the-
ory SDRT, these blocks correspond to complex
discourse units or CDUs (Asher and Lascarides,
2003). A CDU is a structure consisting of ele-
mentary discourse units (typically clauses) that are
linked together by discourse relations and, cru-
cially, that bear together some rhetorical relation
to another discourse unit. For example, the block
(3) below in an SDRT analysis would yield a CDU
consisting of several EDUs; the first sentence (a)
yields an EDU that is elaborated on by the EDU
derived from (b), with the (c) and (d) elaborating
on (b). The division of the conversation into CDUs
and their numbering will help us in carrying out a
detailed analysis in Section 4.
Fielding a question about his experience to be
president given that he is a very junior US sen-
ator, R initially responds with (1) a summary of
his record in the Senate, (2) a short argument that
experience isn’t sufficient for being President and
then concludes (3) by drawing a comparison be-
tween himself and Obama, who, like R, had only
one term of political experience at the national
level before running for President:
(3) “(a) And let’s dispel once and for all with
this fiction that Barack Obama doesn’t
know what he’s doing. (b) He knows
exactly what he’s doing. (c) Barack
Obama is undertaking a systematic effort
to change this country, (d) to make Amer-
ica more like the rest of the world.”
(3) is a coherent move when R utters it. The ques-
tion to which R is responding carries with it an
implicit argument against him. The major premise
of that argument is that no one who has had only
one term of legislative experience could be a Pres-
ident who “knows what he’s doing.” R argues that
Obama was very effective, thus challenging this
premise.
The floor then goes to Governor Christie (C) of
New Jersey, who takes issue with R’s response and
attacks his record in the Senate (4) and picks up the
comparison to Obama (5). R responds by attack-
ing C’s record as governor (6), which is a natural
move. But then something strange happens: in (7),
R goes back and repeats (3) almost verbatim:
(7) “But I would add this. Let’s dispel with
this fiction that Barack Obama doesn’t
know what he’s doing. He knows exactly
what he’s doing. He is trying to change
this country. He wants America to become
more like the rest of the world.”
C then characterizes R’s response in an extremely
damaging way:
(8) “That’s what Washington, D.C. Does.
The drive-by shot at the beginning with
incorrect and incomplete information and
then the memorized 25-second speech that
is exactly what his advisers gave him.”
The debate continues with R again attacking C’s
record (9). Had R stuck to this strategy, he might
have recovered from his faux pas repetition; but
instead, he goes back and repeats in block (10) the
material in (3) and (7) without any attempt to re-
spond to C’s characterization of the repetition in
(7). In block (11) C once again points out the
“memorized text” to R’s detriment. The effect of
this repetition and his failure to counter C’s nega-
tive characterization of it was disastrous for R as
pundits claimed and subsequent polls confirmed;
C’s characterization gave a label for R’s “robotic
performance,” and the video in (Christie-Rubio-
debate, 2016) went viral.
While prior work on a conversationalist’s suc-
cess or ‘power status’ has focused on superficial
features like the number of turns the speaker has,
the length of time she has spoken, or word bi-
grams (Prabhakaran et al., 2012; Prabhakaran et
al., 2013), examples like the Rubio gaffe show
that a dialogue participant’s success in meeting her
conversational objectives depends upon the indi-
vidual moves that she makes in the particular dia-
logue context. When pundits and the public eval-
uated the debate performance of the candidates,
they justified their evaluations by making refer-
ence to particular moves in the debate, including
R’s ‘robotic’ repetitions. Had R simply given (3)
in his response to the moderator’s leading ques-
tion, the response would have been fine. But same
message (e.g. (7) and (10)) in a different context
(e.g. following (4) and (5) and then (8)) gets a very
different and bad score. Further, R’s ‘robotic’ re-
sponse affects the evaluation of the rest of the con-
versation, penalizing his subsequent performance.
To model evaluations of conversational success,
we need to answer three questions: (a) how do
we characterize the context upon which the evalu-
ation is based? (b) in virtue of what does one give
such an evaluation? (c) how does the evaluation
proceed? Given our characterization of Rubio’s
performance, evaluators are sensitive to the exact
words used, to the conversational string, but they
also evaluate whether a particular discourse move
or sequence of moves performs a coherent rhetor-
ical role, like answering a question, amplifying on
a response to a question, rebutting a prior attack
move by another participant, and so on.
With respect to question b, evaluators exploit
criteria like responsiveness and coherence, tak-
ing, e.g., an attack on an agent i to which i has
no coherent rebuttal to contribute to a negative
evaluation of a response given by i. Evaluation
of conversational success also depends, however,
on what is needed to persuade the evaluator that
an agent has been successful. This may depend
upon the agent’s own global goals like defending
a particular position, but it may also depend upon
the evaluator’s preconception of what a successful
conversation for i would be.
Finally, to answer question c, a global evalu-
ation of Player i’s contributions depends on the
contributions she makes on each of her turns and
how they are related to the discourse context. The
evaluation of i’s performance in the conversation
should be a function of the evaluation she receives
on each turn. We examine a normalized, additive
function that assigns to each turn for every de-
bater i a score in {0, 1, . . . , d} where d is a pos-
itive integer. However, a bad evaluation on one
turn like that of Rubio’s (or 1988 Vice-Presidential
candidate Quayle’s famous gaffe (Asher and Paul,
2013)) colors the evaluation of further turns, and
several bad evaluations can doom the entire con-
versation by heavily ‘discounting’ the value of fu-
ture moves.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2.1 introduces weighted ME games—that
is, ME games with weights or scores for each
move of a play. The weights are accumulated over
the entire play by the method of discounting. Sec-
tion 2.2 extensively discusses a discounting factor
to account for the penalties that the speakers incur
from making disastrous discourse moves. As we
show in Section 3, the discounting factor entails
the existence of ǫ-Nash equilibria for weighted
ME games, meaning that a notion of optimal ra-
tional play exists for our games. Section 4 ap-
plies our notion of weighted ME games to the Ru-
bio/Christie exchange, while Section 5 considers
related work. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The model
In this section we introduce Weighted Message
Exchange games and formulate a discounting
mechanism to accumulate the weights of the
moves along a play.
2.1 ME and WME games
Definition 1 (ME game (Asher et al., 2016))
A Message Exchange game (ME game) is a
tuple G = ((V0 ∪ V1)
ω,Win0,Win1) with
Win0,Win1 ⊆ (V0 ∪ V1)
ω.
V0 and V1 are called the vocabularies of players
0 and 1 respectively. The intuitive idea behind an
ME game is that a conversation proceeds in turns
where in each turn one of the players ‘speaks’ or
plays a string of letters from her own vocabulary.
However, the player does not speak any garbled
sequence of strings but sentences or sets of sen-
tences that ‘make sense’. We capture by setting V0
and V1 to be SDRSs (Asher and Lascarides, 2003).
See (Asher et al., 2016) for a detailed discussion
on this topic and the motivation behind the formal
setting of ME games.
Formally the ME game G is played as follows.
Player 0 starts the game by playing a non-empty
sequence in V +0 . The turn then moves to Player 1
who plays a non-empty sequence from V +1 . The
turn then goes back to Player 0 and so on. The
game generates a play pn after n (≥ 0) turns,
where by convention, p0 = ǫ (the empty move).
A play can potentially go on forever generating
an infinite play pω, or more simply p. Plays are
segmented into rounds—a move by Player 0 fol-
lowed by a move by Player 1. A finite play of
an ME game is (also) called a history, and is de-
noted by h. Let Z be the set of all such histories,
Z ⊆ (V0 ∪V1)
∗, where ǫ ∈ Z is the empty history
and where a history of the form (V0 ∪ V1)
+V +0 is
a 0-history and one of the form (V0 ∪ V1)
+V +1 is
a 1-history. We denote the set of 0-histories (1-
histories) by Z0 (Z1). Thus Z = Z0 ∪ Z1. For
h ∈ Z, turns(h) denotes the total number of turns
(by either player) in h.
We are interested in an extension of ME games
where a Jury assigns a non-negative integer weight
or score to every move by each player. The Jury
then accumulates these weights in a way it deems
suitable to compute the global score of the play
for each player. In what follows, unless otherwise
mentioned, i will range over the set of players,
here {0, 1}. Thus, Player (1 − i) denotes Player
i’s opponent.
Let Z be the set of all integers and Z+ be the
set of non-negative integers. For any n ∈ Z+ let
[n] = [0, n − 1] ∩ Z+ = {0, 1, . . . , n − 1}. A
weight function is a function w : (Z0×V
+
1 ∪Z1×
V +0 )→ Z× Z. Intuitively, given a history h ∈ Z,
w assigns a tuple of integers (a0, a1) = w(h, x)
to the next legal move x of the play h. Note
that the weight function, w depends on the cur-
rent history of the game in that, given two dif-
ferent histories h1, h2 ∈ Z, it might be the case
that w(h1, x) )= w(h2, x) for the same continu-
ing move x. For notational simplicity, in what fol-
lows, given a play p = x0x1 . . . of G, we shall
denote by wni (p), the weight assigned by w to
Player i in the nth turn of p (n ≥ 1). That is,
if w(pn−1, xn) = (a0, a1), then w
n
0 (p) = a0 and
wn1 (p) = a1
Definition 2 (WME game) A weighted ME game
(WME game) is a tuple G = ((V0∪V1)
ω, w) where
w is a weight function.
In Section 3, We will formally define a Jury who
assigns weights to the moves of the game in a play
p and accumulates them in a way it deems suit-
able to have a global evaluation of p for both the
players. One of the standard methods for perform-
ing such an accumulation is ‘discounting’ (Shap-
ley, 1953). In discounting, along a play p, the im-
mediate moves are assigned high values and the
moves further and further into the future are as-
signed lower and lower values. This is achieved by
multiplying the weight of every subsequent move
by a factor λ, which is usually fixed to be a con-
stant between 0 and 1. However, in our case,
to capture the context dependence of evaluations,
we shall set λ to be a function of the history h,
λ : Z → (0, 1).
Before fixing λ, we define first the discounted
weight of a play and a discounted WME game.
Definition 3 (Discounted-payoff) Let p be a play
of G and let λ be a discounting function. Then the
discounted-payoff of p for Player i is given by
wDi (p) =
∑
n≥1
λ(pn−1)
n−1wni (p)
Definition 4 (Discounted WME game) Let w be
a weight function and λ be a discounting function.
A discounted WME game with discount λ is a tuple
GD[λ] = ((V0 ∪ V1)
ω, w) such that for every play
p, Player i receives a payoff of wDi (p).
When λ is clear from the context, we shall sim-
ply write GD instead of GD[λ]. A (pure) strat-
egy σi for Player i is defined in the standard way,
σi : Z1−i → V
+
i . A play p = x0x1x2 . . . con-
forms to a strategy σi of Player i if she always
plays according to σi in p, that is, for every j > 0,
j − 1 = i (mod 2) implies xj = σi(pj−1). We
denote by p(σ0,σ1) the unique play conforming to
the tuple of strategies (σ0,σ1).
Definition 5 (Best-response / Nash-equilibrium)
A strategy σi of Player i is a best-response to a
strategy σ1−i of Player (1 − i) if for every other
strategy σ′i of Player i, we have
wDi (p(σi,σ1−i)) ≥ w
D
i (p(σ′
i
,σ1−i))
Given ǫ > 0, σi is an ǫ-best-response to σ1−i if for
every other strategy σ′i of Player i, we have
wDi (p(σi,σ1−i)) ≥ w
D
i (p(σ′
i
,σ1−i))− ǫ
A tuple of strategies (σ0,σ1) is a Nash equilibrium
(resp. ǫ-Nash equilibrium) if σ0 and σ1 are mutual
best-responses (resp. ǫ-best-responses).
We can also define natural notions of a win,
winning-strategy etc. as follows, for both zero sum
and non-zero sum games.
Definition 6 (Winning and winning strategy)
Let GD[λ] = ((V0 ∪ V1)
ω, w) be a discounted
WME game. Then (i) Zero-sum: Player i wins
a play p of GD[λ] if w
D
i (p) ≥ w
D
1−i(p). Player
(1 − i) wins p otherwise. (ii) Non-zero sum: Fix
constants νi ∈ R called ‘thresholds’. Then Player
i wins a play p if wDi (p) ≥ νi. (iii) A strategy
σi is winning for Player i if she wins all plays p
conforming to σi.
2.2 The discounting factor
We now fix the exact form of the discounting fac-
tor λ to suit evaluations of conversational success.
We assume that w is both integral and bounded,
that is, the range of w is [d] for some constant
d ∈ Z+. A move with a weight of ‘0’ is a ‘fail-
ure’ or a ‘disastrous move’ and heavily penalizes a
player’s future play. Also a move that gets weight
‘d’ is a ‘brilliant move’; if such a move follows a
disastrous move then it is a ‘recovery move’.
For any history h, the function λ consists of two
terms
λ(h) = λ1λ
reci(h)
turns(h)−1
2
The first is the global discounting which weighs
initial moves more than later ones. This reflects
the intuition: “get your best licks in first” - the
player who does better initially often has an upper
hand throughout the course of the debate. The sec-
ond term is the ‘punishing factor’ that heavily dis-
counts disastrous moves of a player. It ‘kicks in’
after the first disastrous move made by the player
and gets worse if she keeps making such moves. A
player may also recover from a disastrous move by
making a number of brilliant moves, after which
the punishing factor disappears, but might kick in
again in the future. reci(h) is thus the ‘recovery
index’ of Player i at history h and is computed
using Algorithm 1 [note that the denominator of
(turns(h)−1) occurs in the index of λ2 so that the
number of turns does not affect it like it does for
the global discounting λ1].
Algorithm 1: RECi(h)
data:h; result:reci(h)
let rec i = 0; good = 0
for j=1 to turns(h) do
if w
j
i (h) = 0 then rec i++
if rec i=0 then good=0
if rec i > 0 then
if w
j
i (h) = d then good++
if good=c then rec i--; good=0
return rec i
Intuitively, Algorithm 1 starts accumulating the
number of disastrous moves occurred. If Player i
plays ‘c’ recovery moves after having played one
or more disastrous move, the accumulated count
of the disastrous moves decreases by 1. If i has
fully recovered, it stops keeping track of the bril-
liant moves. The process repeats when i plays a
disastrous move again.
3 Finite satisfiability and the Jury
We can now formalize the notion of the Jury. The
Jury fixes the weights of the moves of the Players
and also the parameters of the discounting func-
tion λ. That is, it fixes λ1,λ2 and c. Thus
Definition 7 (Jury) The Jury for a discounted
WME game GD is a tuple J = (w,λ1,λ2, c)
where w is a weight function.
Although the game GD can potentially go on
forever, the Jury has to decide the winner after a
finite number of turns. We can compute a bound
on the number of turns after which the Jury can
confidently decide the winner of the game. This
is facilitated by the discounting of the weights and
also the fact that w is integral and bounded. We
have
Proposition 1 Fix a discounted WME game GD
with a Jury J = (w,λ1,λ2) such that the range
of w is [d]. Then given ǫ > 0 we have for Player i
and any play p of GD
wDi (p) ≤
nǫ∑
j=1
λ(pj−1)
j−1w
j
i (p) + ǫ
where nǫ ≤
ln[ ǫ
d
(1−λ1)]
lnλ1
− 1.
Proof Suppose Player i does not play any disas-
trous move after nǫ turns. The maximum payoff
she can gain after nǫ turns is λ
nǫ+1
1
1
1−λ1
d. Setting
λ
nǫ+1
1
1
1− λ1
d ≤ ǫ
we have nǫ ≤
ln[ ǫ
d
(1−λ1)]
lnλ1
− 1.
Thus, if the Jury stops the game after nǫ turns,
they can be sure no player would have gained more
than ǫ, had the game been allowed to continue for-
ever. Note that this result is fully general, but that
values for nǫ will very much depend on the values
set for λ1 and λ2.
Remark Note that it is crucial to assume that the
players are unaware of the parameters of the Jury,
w,λ1,λ2 and c. Otherwise, they can compute nǫ
on their own. The game then becomes equivalent
to a finite extensive form game with a set end,
which is against the view on modeling strategic
conversations defended in (Asher et al., 2016) that
we have adopted. Thus, although the Jury takes a
decision on the outcome of the game after a finite
number of turns, the players do not know when
that decision takes place. Thus, the game still ap-
pears to the players as potentially unbounded.
From Proposition 1, it also follows that ǫ-Nash
equilibria always exist in our discounted WME
games in pure strategies. However, since our space
of strategies is uncountably infinite, the existence
of Nash equilibria is a delicate matter (see for e.g.
(Levy, 2013)) and we intend to explore it further
in future work.
Corollary 1 Given ǫ > 0, a discounted WME
game always has an ǫ-Nash equilibrium.
Proof Consider the ‘finite’ discounted WME
game for nǫ turns where nǫ is given by Proposi-
tion 1. Define the relation ∼ on plays of nǫ turns
as: for two plays p and p′, p ∼ p′ iff for all
j : 1 ≤ j ≤ nǫ, w
j
i (p) = w
j
i (p
′) and wj1−i(p) =
w
j
1−i(p
′). Clearly, ∼ is an equivalence relation.
Also, since w is integral and bounded, there are
only a finitely many possibilities for the weights
of each Player i along any play p, and thus ∼ has
finitely many equivalence classes. Thus there is a
finite number of discounted payoffs possible (one
for each equivalence class of ∼) after nǫ turns.
A backward induction procedure on the equiva-
lence classes of ∼ gives an ǫ-Nash equilibrium tu-
ple of strategies ([σ0], [σ1]) on these classes. In-
deed, since by Proposition 1, no player can gain
more than ǫ by deviating from it. Lifting [σ0] and
[σ1] to corresponding representative elements of
functions over actual histories gives us a required
ǫ-Nash equilibrium (σ0,σ1).
4 Applications
In Section 2, we developed weighting functions
with two discounting parameters, λ1 and λ2 and
a recovery constant c. λ1 discounts future moves
in the standard way agreeing with our intuition
that good moves carry more value if played earlier
than later. λ2 is particular to WME games, that
derives from agents’ bad moves a penalty that ad-
versely affects their score. c represents the number
of brilliant moves required by a player to recover
from a single disastrous move. These parameters
are decided by the Jury. In this section we ex-
amine an WME game evaluation of our example
dialogue, framed by the question as to whether
Rubio has the experience to be president to be
a dialogue on its own. The exchange is rather
lengthy from the perspective of giving a complete
discourse structure in which each clause is linked
to other clauses via one or more rhetorical rela-
tions; this particular part of the political debate
has over 200 clauses or elementary discourse unit
(EDU). However, SDRT groups EDUs into more
complex units or CDUs, small discourse graphs on
their own that also have rhetorical links to other
discourse units (Asher and Lascarides, 2003). As
coherence is assured amongst the EDUs within the
blocks, we will look only at the organization of
CDUs and their relation to the whole dialogue, for
it is there where the Jury has an important effect.
Our example is a fragment of a zero sum WME
game. Let us denote the actual debate that un-
folded between Rubio (R) and Christie (C), which
is a play of the above game, as pRC . Rubio’s goal
is to provide a convincing answer to the modera-
tor’s (M) question: to convince the public that he
has the experience to be President. The goal of the
antagonist, here C, is to destroy that answer, and
C is very effective in doing that. Let us see how.
To do so, we will examine the role of the CDU
blocks of the debate, which we’ve numbered in
the introduction as (1)-(11), in the context of the
Jury which is here the audience in the debate. For
the sake of concreteness, we will take a particular
integer scale and discount values for the weight-
ing scheme; we feel that the scheme is defensi-
ble, though we acknowledge that there are many
weighting schemes to choose from and we are un-
sure at this point exactly how to determine optimal
weighting schemes or even whether such exits. We
will also leave the tie between the details of the
discourse structure and the weighting scheme rel-
atively programmatic for now, as we have not fully
figured out at present all the parameters of varia-
tion in this relation. Based on the Jury’s evalua-
tions and its applause reactions, we fix the range
of w to be [5] × [5]. We also fix λ1 = 0.9 and
λ2 = 0.5. Thus the global discounting λ1 is more
or less gradual whereas the penalty discounting λ2
for disastrous moves by either player is pretty se-
vere. Let us also assume that the recovery constant
c = 5. As we will show, these values fit the facts
of the conversational sequences we have analyzed.
After the CDU introducing the question of polit-
ical experience to R, R’s response has 3 CDUS: 1)
he talks about his record; 2) he argues that years
of experience is not sufficient; years of experi-
ence aren’t necessary either; 3) Obama with lit-
tle experience knows exactly what he’s doing (not
necessary). We’ll call (3) the Obama CDU. This
seems to be a perfectly adequate response; it is re-
sponsive to the question and internally coherent.
The audience applauds politely, and we could fix
w(ǫ, 〈1〉〈2〉〈3〉) = (3, 1). That is R (Player 0) gets
a score of 3 for his points 1,2 and 3 which satisfac-
tory but not overwhelming and C (Player 1) reaps
only a minimal reward of 1 at this stage.
The moderator then invites C to comment on
R’s prior response. 4) C mounts a direct attack
on R’s record. 5) C also picks up on R’s reference
Obama but uses Obama as an example of disas-
trous government on the part of an inexperience
one time senator, which indirectly attacks R as
well. There are two points at which the audience
applauds so we might set w(〈1〉〈2〉〈3〉, 〈4〉〈5〉) =
(1, 4). C has a forceful reply and R gains only
minimally from C’s response.
Now R in (6) briefly responds with an attack
on C’s record as a problem solver but then in (7)
returns to the Obama CDU. The problem is that
the Obama CDU does not cohere with (6). R flubs
the connection between the attack by implicating
contrast (“but let me add this”), when he should
have made an explicit reference back to C’s use
of Obama’s record. While the point could have
been effective, it wasn’t rhetorically crafted in the
right way, and the Obama CDU seems just to hang
there, in addition to (7)’s being an almost verbatim
repetition of (3). We could even imagine that C
actually gains from R’s dubious move. So here
we let w(〈1〉〈2〉〈3〉〈4〉〈5〉, 〈6〉〈7〉)) = (1, 2). This
inept response nevertheless does not kick in the
penalty discount λ2 for R yet, as λ2 only makes a
difference if there are moves evaluated with 0.
R’s inept rhetorical connection and reuse of the
Obama CDU gives C a crucial opening; C char-
acterizes R’s attack and the incoherently linked
Obama CDU in a devastating way in (8). That
is, (8) has the rhetorical function of comment-
ing on the Obama CDU, not its content but its
representation. With (8), C provides an eval-
uation of R’s turn that capitalizes on its inept
rhetorical structure. The audience sees the apt-
ness of the characterization and roars its approval.
Their evaluation coincides with C’s, which means:
w(〈1〉〈2〉〈3〉〈4〉〈5〉〈6〉〈7〉, 〈8〉) = (0, 5).
λ2 now kicks in and since it is relatively
low (0.5), R would have to do very well for
the rest of the debate while C has to do very
badly in order for R to win. We do allow
that a long sequence of very good moves re-
sets λ2, but this seems to happen rarely. Actu-
ally, things get worse for R. In (10) R starts to
deliver the Obama CDU again. Given (8), we
can set w(〈1〉〈2〉〈3〉〈4〉〈5〉〈6〉〈7〉〈8〉, 〈9〉〈10〉)) =
(0, 5), that is, it is a disastrous move for R
while C’s reputation is not hampered in any
way. Moreover, C in (11) reuses his character-
ization again on R’s contribution in (10), mak-
ing w(〈1〉〈2〉〈3〉〈4〉〈5〉〈6〉〈7〉〈8〉〈9〉〈10〉, 〈11〉)) =
(0, 5). At this point the contribution of the penalty
discount, λ2, is cubed (= 0.125), which is terri-
ble for R. This makes C’s characterization of his
performance stick and affects the audience’s (Jury)
evaluations for the rest of R’s turns.
We can now compute the discounted payoff to
R and C respectively after these 3 rounds of pRC
as:
R : 3 + (0.95) · 1 + (0.9)2 · 1 + (0.9)3(0.5) · 0
+ (0.9)4(0.5)2 · 0 + (0.9)5(0.5)3 · 0 = 4.76
C : 1 + (0.9) · 4 + (0.9)2 · 2 + (0.9)3 · 5
+ (0.9)4 · 5 + (0.9)5 · 5 = 16.10
Thus we see that after just 6 turns C has a over-
whelming advantage over R in terms of his dis-
counted payoff. Now suppose R tries to recover
by playing brilliant moves (so as to neutralize
the penalty discounting λ2). That is, suppose he
scores 5 for each of the subsequent 15 turns. Since
c = 5, after each set of 5 turns the index of λ2 will
reduce by 1. A simple calculation shows us that
the payoff to R after these 15 turns (that is a total
of 6+15=21 turns) would be 9.63. After that, the
penalty discounting λ2 would disappear. But from
then on the global discount λ1 itself would start
contributing heavily to the weights of the moves
and we can show that even if R keeps playing bril-
liant moves forever, the maximum payoff he can
receive from then on is just 5.47. Thus his total
payoff in the infinite game after the initial slump
is 9.63+5.47=15.10 which is still less than what C
has amassed in the first 6 rounds (16.10). This jus-
tifies Proposition 1 and shows that the Jury can al-
ready offer the win to C (which it implicitly does).
What is crucial here is that C’s attack on R’s de-
livery rings true, and the fact that R could have
attempted to rebut C’s commentary but did not,
confirms C’s characterization of it. This affects
the rest of the debate’s evaluation; R’s subsequent
moves never mattered. In other words, the fate
of R’s evaluation was sealed after this initial ex-
change of 3 rounds. Thus, not responding to an
attack on either the style or the substance of ones
contributions forces the evaluation to go negative
as in (Asher et al., 2016)’s general constraint.
(Asher and Paul, 2013) gives another example
of a disastrous debate move. Though (Asher and
Paul, 2013) does not use a weighing function and
discounted payoffs, we can still apply our formal-
ism to that example. The example concerns Sen-
ator Dan Quayle’s (Q) reply to a similar question
about his experience to be President in the 1988
Vice-Presidential debate, in which he drew a par-
allel between his own experience and that of Pres-
ident John Kennedy (K). His opponent, senator
Lloyd Bentsen (B), took a weak implicature from
Q’s response, that Q had the potential to be a simi-
lar president to K, and attacked it forcefully, draw-
ing a roar of appreciation from the audience, giv-
ing Q a score of 0 for that move. Q’s subsequent
rejoinder “that was unfair Senator, unfair,” was a
comment that did not take issue with B’s draw-
ing of the implicature concerning Q and K. This
amounted to a tacit acceptance of the implicature.
Given that B had refuted that implicature, Q was
saddled with having conveyed an implicit content
that he was unable to defend but accepted, which
netted him a second zero, which was enough to
sink his performance for the rest of the debate. B’s
attack move, though different from C’s in (8) in
that it attacked content not presentation, also col-
ored Q’s performance for the rest of the debate.
Q’s evaluation went to the bottom of the scale for
the rest of the debate and stayed there, making B
the clear winner.
We have modeled the consequences of disas-
trous moves on evaluations of a conversational
play. But what about brilliant moves that are not
attacks, how do they function? One memorable
line used over by Ronald Reagan during the 1980
US Presidential campaign was “Are you better off
than you were four years ago?” In one question,
Reagan was able to remind Americans that they
were worse-off under the incumbent Carter; in-
flation and unemployment had dramatically risen
under Carter and purchasing power has waned.
Carter himself described the American mood as a
“malaise” during his Presidency. This one move
set the tone for the discussion and put Reagan in
a winning position, as Carter could not convinc-
ingly counter the obvious “no” answer to Rea-
gan’s question.
We can model the above in our setting of WME
games with w assigning a 5 to this move by Rea-
gan and a 0 to Carter. Carter’s inability to respond
convincingly saddles him with another 0 and this
colors the evaluation by w of the ensuing debate,
heavily favoring Reagan. Reagan continues to get
high scores for all his moves while Carter fares
badly, which accords with history: Reagan was
pronounced a clear winner of the exchange.
5 Related Work
As alluded to in the introduction, game theory has
been used before in the literature for the anal-
ysis of strategic message-exchange. The focus
for the purpose has mostly been on the use of
signaling games (Spence, 1973). However, sig-
naling games lack the necessary tools to model
situations where the interests of the players are
opposed, as is the case in the current setting.
Noteworthy also is the work on persuasion games
(Glazer and Rubinstein, 2001; Glazer and Rubin-
stein, 2004) which has the setup similar to that
of signaling games where a ‘speaker’ is trying to
persuade an uninformed ‘listener’ about the cur-
rent state of the world. Despite being hugely suc-
cessful in modeling many different economic and
strategic situations, signaling games have certain
drawbacks which restricts their applicability to dy-
namic strategic conversations, as in the current set-
ting. This issue has been extensively discussed in
(Asher et al., 2016).
Our notion of evaluation makes use of discourse
structural moves and depends on work on dis-
course structure and rhetorical relations like that of
(Asher and Lascarides, 2003); to our knowledge,
we are the first to model evaluations of conversa-
tional success by exploiting ideas of discourse co-
herence and discourse structure, along with tech-
niques of discounting from game theory. Our ac-
count also makes at least informal use of the no-
tion of an attack, and is thus related to work on
argumentation (Dung, 1995; Besnard and Hunter,
2008). (Besnard and Hunter, 2008) also considers
a definition for evaluating an argument by an au-
dience. They structure arguments as trees, which
roughly parallels the notion of a discourse graph
in SDRT (Stede et al., 2016). They also use a
discounting function, so that more deeply embed-
ded arguments (responding to prior attacks) are
weighted less than the main arguments and coun-
terarguments at the top. This discounting func-
tion is similar to our λ1. However, there is noth-
ing in the argumentation literature of the form of
our penalty discount λ2 for convincing attacks and
very bad moves. And to our knowledge, no one
in the argumentation literature, or anywhere else,
has tried to formalize an evaluation of attacks and
refutations over the course of a dialogue. The
analysis of argumentation in game theoretic terms,
which is a consequence of our approach, is also the
first of its kind to our knowledge.
Evaluations of conversational success are also
related to linguistic work on predicates of taste
(Lasersohn, 2005; Glanzberg, 2007; Crespo and
Ferna´ndez, 2011), in that our evaluations are rela-
tive to the standards of a person or group. It may
be that two people may disagree over a evalua-
tion of i’s contributions, because they have incom-
patible views of what constitutes conversational
success for i, just as people may disagree about
whether say blood sausage is tasty or not. The re-
ceived wisdom about predicates of taste, however,
is there is ‘no fact of the matter’ as to whether
blood sausage is tasty or not. We do not believe
this carries over to evaluations of conversational
success. Given that players in a political debate
have the goal of convincing the public, it is re-
ally the public’s evaluation that counts and gives
an ‘objective’ evaluation of the player’s success in
terms of their own interests. Work on automatic
debate evaluation in terms of an audience’s reac-
tions has attracted interest in NLP (Prabhakaran et
al., 2012; Prabhakaran and Rambow, 2013; Prab-
hakaran et al., 2013), for which weighted ME
games provide a formal framework.
6 Conclusions
We have presented a model of the evaluation of
conversational success, WME games. Extending
the framework of infinite ME games for modeling
conversations introduced in (Asher et al., 2016),
we have shown how a Jury can concretely eval-
uate a player’s conversational success. We have
illustrated how such evaluations depend upon the
structure and content of a person’s contributions as
well as on discounting functions, and we have an-
alyzed at length one sample conversation to show
an evaluation process at work. Our discounting
functions entail: (i) it is best to get one’s very
good moves in early, (ii) a sequence of moves that
are bad by Player i affects the evaluation of future
moves, and in particular, (iii) a failure by i to re-
spond effectively to a convincing attack on i’s ear-
lier moves is disastrous, because λ2 becomes very
significant.
There are many ways in which we wish to ex-
tend this work. First, we want to explore further
the space of weighting and discounting functions;
different functions will yield new and potentially
interesting evaluation schemes. Secondly, we wish
to enrich our model with an epistemic framework
by introducing imperfect information (Harsanyi,
1968). In the present abstract, as remarked, we
assume that the players are unaware of the param-
eters of the Jury. Elaborating on this, we might
assume that a Jury can be of different ‘types’. For
instance, it may be ‘biased’ towards a particular
player or may be ‘fair’ to everybody. It may be
‘patient’ (with high λ1) or ‘impatient’ (with low
λ1); ‘strict’ (with low λ2) or ‘lenient’ (with high
λ2). In addition, the players might themselves be
of different types: risk-takers, risk-aversers, ratio-
nal, irrational etc. Players are aware of their own
types but are uncertain about the types of the other
players and that of the Jury; they hold certain ‘be-
liefs’ about these unknown types. A player’s strat-
egy now depends not only on the history but her
own type and her beliefs about the types of the
other players and that of the Jury. Such an ap-
proach is standard in epistemic game-theory and
we believe that augmenting the current framework
of WME games with it will lead to a much more
complete analysis of the behavior of conversation-
alists and evaluations of conversations.
Finally, we wish to explore the existence of
Nash equilibria and other solution concepts in our
WME games and explore rationality criteria.
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